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Modeling Electoral Coordination: Voters, 
Parties and Legislative Lists in Uruguay 
Ines Levin and Gabriel Katz 
Abstract: During each electoral period, the strategic interaction between 
voters and political elites determines the number of viable candidates in a 
district. In this paper, we implement a hierarchical seemingly unrelated re-
gression model to explain electoral coordination at the district level in Uru-
guay as a function of district magnitude, previous electoral outcomes and 
electoral regime. Elections in this country are particularly useful to test for 
institutional effects on the coordination process due to the large variations 
in district magnitude, to the simultaneity of presidential and legislative races 
held under different rules, and to the reforms implemented during the pe-
riod under consideration. We find that district magnitude and electoral his-
tory heuristics have substantial effects on the number of competing and 
voted-for parties and lists. Our modeling approach uncovers important 
interaction-effects between the demand and supply side of the political mar-
ket that were often overlooked in previous research. 
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Introduction 
Elections pose a substantive coordination problem for voters and political 
elites. To avoid wasting their vote on hopeless candidates, voters may 
choose to support candidates or parties that, despite not ranking first in 
their preference ordering, have higher prospects of securing legislative rep-
resentation or cabinet posts than their favorite electoral options (Cox 1997; 
Palfrey 1989). Similarly, political elites tend to concentrate endorsements 
and resources on those candidates who are expected to fare better (Boix 
1999; Osborne and Slivinski 1996). The incentives for strategic behavior 
channeled through the electoral system encourage the coordination between 
voters striving to cast a “useful” vote and politicians trying to maximize 
their chances of success and constrain the number of viable contestants in a 
race. In this sense, “electoral coordination” can be broadly defined as the 
process by which “groups of voters and politicians coordinate their electoral 
actions in order to win more legislative seats or executive portfolios” (Cox 
2000: 49). 
Strategic coordination affects the number and characteristics – e.g., 
platforms, ideological positions – of the parties competing in an election, the 
representation of voter preferences and political interests, and the policy-
making patterns of the elected authorities. In view of its significance, the 
political science literature has devoted considerable efforts to understanding 
how the coordination process is mediated by alternative institutional de-
signs, with particular emphasis on the role of electoral rules and, in the case 
of legislative races, of district magnitude (Cox 1997; Duverger 1954; Lijphart 
1994; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Taagepera and Shugart 1989). Dis-
tinct combinations of district magnitude and electoral rules determine the 
rates at which votes can be converted into seats and condition the extent to 
which the articulation of citizens’ vote choice and politicians’ entry and exit 
decisions reduce the competition to only a subset of viable candidates 
(Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Cox 1997; Duverger 1954; Leys 1959; 
Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Sartori 1968).1  
Although the interplay between the demand and the supply side of the 
political market is central to the coordination game, few – if any – empirical 
studies have carefully examined the interdependence between the two sides. 
The vast majority of the applied work in this area has concentrated exclu-
sively on either strategic voting or strategic entry decisions (Blais and Carty 
1  Acknowledgments: We are grateful to Rafael Piñeiro, who kindly provided us data 
corresponding to Uruguayan elections taking place between 1942 and 2004. We 
also thank Professors R. Michael Alvarez, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Jean-Laurent 
Rosenthal for their helpful comments. 
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1991; Indridason 2008). Even authors underscoring the fundamental corre-
spondence between the strategic behavior of voters and political elites – 
most notably Cox (1997) and, more recently, Gschwend (2007) and Lago 
(2008), among others – have generally focused on the determinants of tacti-
cal voting first and only explored its implications for political competition at 
a later stage. We adopt a different approach in this paper, investigating the 
concurrent impact of electoral rules and district magnitude on the strategic 
behavior of voters and political elites and their dynamic interactions. Spe-
cifically, we develop a hierarchical seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
model (Chib and Greenberg 1995) to jointly analyze the evolution of the 
number of competing and voted-for parties and lists in thirteen concomitant 
presidential and legislative elections held in Uruguay between 1946 and 
2009. 
Uruguay, one of Latin America’s most stable and consolidated democ-
racies (Cason 2002; Morgenstern 2001), provides an especially interesting 
case study to assess the impact of institutional factors on strategic coordina-
tion. The large disparities in district magnitude and the electoral reforms 
implemented in the country in the last 60 years – which affected the rules 
used for presidential races while leaving those regulating the distribution of 
legislative seats virtually unchanged – allow a systematic evaluation of 
agents’ responses to changes in key features of the electoral regime over 
time. In addition, the close link between presidential and legislative elections, 
together with Uruguay’s highly factionalized party structure and the incen-
tives for within-party competition prevailing in house races, requires us to 
take a multi-level perspective to the study of strategic coordination, includ-
ing not only parties and voters but also factions as units of analysis to ac-
count for the “contamination” between the national and sub-national politi-
cal arenas (Lago and Montero 2009). Using data on electoral results by con-
stituency from a single, relatively homogeneous polity enables us to test for 
these institutional effects at the district level while attenuating the con-
founding influence of other relevant variables – such socio-demographic 
characteristics, political culture, issue dimensions and their salience – that 
may obscure cross-national comparisons. 
Our results indicate that there is a strong relationship between charac-
teristics of the electoral structure and strategic coordination by voters and 
political elites. For instance, we find that district magnitude has a positive 
and statistically significant impact on the number of launched parties and 
lists, and to a lesser extent on the number of voted-for lists. We also find 
that there are considerable interaction effects between the supply- and de-
mand-side of the electoral game, and that there is high inertia in the behav-
ior of voters and political elites across elections. These findings have rele-
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vant implications in view of the frequency and scope of the institutional 
transformations introduced in virtually every Latin American democracy in 
the last decades (Remmer 2008). The instability and variation of electoral 
rules throughout the region has spurred an overriding interest in the conse-
quences of electoral engineering on political stability, partisan competition 
and party systems (Benton 2005; Remmer 2008). A few authors have also 
delved into the issue of tactical voting in Latin America (Wantchekon 1999; 
Benton 2005). Still, with rare exceptions (Cox 1997; Cox and Shugart 1996), 
electoral coordination has received relatively little academic attention in 
Latin America – at least in the English language – compared to industrial-
ized democracies (Blais and Carty 1991, Blais and Gschwend 2010; 
Gschwend 2009). To the best of our knowledge, no work has in fact at-
tempted to simultaneously gauge the repercussions of electoral engineering 
on voters’ and elites’ strategic behavior and their correlation. Our analysis of 
the Uruguayan case constitutes an initial step in this direction. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next two 
sections, we briefly review the literature on electoral coordination and sum-
marize the main characteristics of Uruguay’s electoral institutions and party 
system for the purposes or our study. We then present the hypotheses to be 
tested in the empirical part of the paper and describe our model specifica-
tion and estimation method. Lastly, we discuss the main results of our analy-
sis and proceed to the conclusion. Additional descriptive statistics and esti-
mation results are reported in the Appendix and in the Supplementary Mate-
rials accompanying this paper (see Online Appendix available as this article’s 
supplementary material at <www.jpla.org>). 
The Effect of Institutions on Strategic Coordination: 
Electoral Rules and District Magnitude 
The motivation behind much of the empirical and theoretical work on 
electoral coordination can be traced back to Duverger’s (1954) seminal con-
tribution. In a nutshell, the main thrust of his argument is that the number 
of “serious” – i.e., viable – parties in a polity is essentially determined by the 
mechanism stipulated in the electoral system to translate votes into seats as 
well as by the strategic response of voters and political elites to such mech-
anism. From the voters’ perspective, the primary implication of the “psycho-
logical effect” postulated by Duverger (1954) is that supporters of weak or 
marginal parties would rather support other candidates with higher chances 
of winning than waste their vote on their preferred option. Likewise, 
political elites – opinion leaders, donors, party officials, prominent political 
figures – tend to concentrate their resources – money, endorsements, cam-
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paign appearances, etc. – on candidates with better electoral outlooks while 
abandoning others (Cox 1997). The interaction between short-term instru-
mentally rational voters and elites attempting to affect election results limits 
the actual or voted-for count of competitors, eventually reducing the 
competition to a handful of viable contenders in any given race.  
Although Duverger stressed the importance of the “mechanical” and 
“psychological” effects in single-member plurality elections at the national 
and local level, ensuing research recognized that voters and political elites 
face some incentives for strategic behavior in virtually any electoral system, 
and that these incentives are especially marked at the district level (Cox 
1997; Kiewiet 2011; Leys 1959). Consequently, scholars turned to the analy-
sis of electoral coordination in district races held under diverse electoral 
rules. Subsequent extensions of the “Duvergerian model” retained the basic 
idea that strategic coordination takes place both among the electorate and 
political elites. As summarized in the “M+1 rule” (Cox 1997: 99; Cox and 
Shugart 1996), when voters and candidates in plurality, PR or majority sys-
tems care primarily about the results of the election at hand, the number of 
candidates entering a race, in a district of magnitude M, tends to be no more 
than M+1. If, however, political elites fail to restrict the number of contest-
ants, voters still tend to concentrate their support on at most M+1 of them. 
Therefore, the outcome of the coordination process is driven by the mutu-
ally dependent actions of voters and elites (Blais and Carty 1991; Cox 1997). 
Nevertheless, most authors embraced a “one-sided” methodological stance 
in their applied work, focusing either on strategic voting or on candidates’ 
strategic entry, exit and coalition formation (Blais and Carty 1991; Indri-
dason 2008).  
On the one hand, the literature on tactical voting sought to quantify the 
impact of various combinations of electoral rules and district magnitude on 
strategic party desertion, treating the number of parties as an explanatory 
variable sometimes and as a consequence of voters’ choices other times 
(Blais and Gschwend 2010; Gschwend 2007). Students of comparative 
electoral system have generally concluded that strategic voting is less preva-
lent in proportional representation (PR) or, more generally, in less dispro-
portional systems, while it is most prevalent in single-member plurality re-
gimes. The primary justification for this result is that, in order to avoid 
“wasting” their vote and concentrate their support on viable candidates, 
constituents in single-member plurality elections only need to identify the 
top two candidates in their district (Blais and Gschwend 2010; Kiewiet 
2011). In contrast, incentives for strategic party defection are less compelling 
under proportional representation, since even marginal parties may have a 
chance to gain seats (Gschwend 2007). Moreover, since the number of 
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available electoral options is typically larger in PR than in plurality systems, 
voters might have much more trouble discriminating between hopeless and 
viable candidates (Cox and Shugart 1996). Therefore, even when acknowl-
edging that strategic voting is possible in PR systems, political scientists have 
consistently asserted that it tends to fade out as the district magnitude 
increases because it is too difficult for citizens to figure out which parties are 
marginal and which ones are likely to succeed (Cox 1997; Leys 1959; Sartori 
1968). 
Recent findings, however, cast some doubts on the “conventional wis-
dom” about the impact of electoral institutions on strategic voting. In their 
studies on Portugal and Spain, Gschwend (2007) and Lago (2008) show that 
tactical voting can be observed even in PR systems with large district mag-
nitudes when citizens use simple heuristics – such as previous election re-
sults – to ascertain the viability of the competing parties. Thus, although 
empirical evidence does clearly indicate that the number of seats awarded 
per district is negatively correlated with voters’ propensity to desert their 
preferred electoral option (Gschwend 2009), strategic voting does not seem 
to automatically disappear when “the district magnitude gets above five” 
(Cox 1997: 122). Analogously, other authors have suggested that the influ-
ence of the (dis)proportionality of the electoral regime on strategic party 
defection might have been overstated, and that differences between plural-
ity, runoff and proportional representation in this regard may actually be 
negligible (Abramson et al. 2010; Blais and Gschwend 2010). In other 
words, the link between electoral system and voter behavior seems to be 
much less straightforward than had been previously assumed (Blais and 
Gschwend 2010).  
On the other hand, academics have also concerned themselves with the 
reactions of political elites to the incentives created by the electoral law 
(Blais and Carty 1991; Cox 1997; Gunther 1989). The mechanical effects 
embedded in specific combinations of electoral formula and district magni-
tude encourage office-seeking politicians to form, maintain or disband po-
litical parties, launch or withdraw candidacies in certain districts and form 
coalitions in some others. An impressive wealth of scholarly work inspecting 
the repercussions of diverse electoral systems on the characteristics of parti-
san competition and party systems has accumulated over the years. These 
studies reveal that the electoral supply tends to increase with the propor-
tionality of the system and that PR prompts a larger number of candidates 
and parties than plurality, although the outcome of elites’ coordination de-
pends on factors such as the interaction of district magnitude and electoral 
formula, the interface between PR and plurality rules in mixed-member 
systems, and the degree of political and economic centralization (Blais and 
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Carty 1991; Benoit 2001; Lago and Montero 2009). More generally, they 
have underlined that the partisan effects of electoral laws are not direct or 
deterministic, but critically influenced by strategic considerations of political 
elites, which are generally contingent on their expectations about voters’ 
actions (Gunther 1989). 
Despite this extensive body of research, there is virtually no evidence 
regarding the strength of the interrelation between the strategic behavior of 
voters and political elites and how it is mediated by electoral institutions. 
The fact that the two strands of the literature – one concentrated on voters, 
the other on politicians – remained largely dissociated in empirical work has 
undoubtedly contributed to this state of affairs. In this sense, the failure of 
most studies to simultaneously integrate the demand and the supply side of 
the political market has limited the possibility of an in-depth analysis of the 
relationship between the electoral decisions of the two sides. Besides under-
stating the predominance of elite-voter interactions, this could actually lead 
to erroneous substantive conclusions (Thum 1997) regarding the impact of 
electoral rules and district magnitude, hindering our understanding of the 
coordination process. The methodology implemented in this paper to ana-
lyze the behavior of voters, parties and lists in Uruguay allows overcoming 
these shortcomings. 
Electoral Institutions and Party Structure in 
Uruguay
There are several reasons why Uruguay provides an interesting opportunity 
to assess the influence district magnitude and electoral rules on voters’ and 
elites’ behavior and interactions. 
First, as shown in Table 1, which reports the average number of seats 
awarded in each of Uruguay’s 19 electoral districts between 1946 and 2009, 
district magnitude varies widely across the country.2 Average magnitudes 
range from 43 and 11 in the two largest districts, Montevideo and Canelo-
nes, respectively, to 2 to 4.5 in the remaining 17 constituencies. These dif-
ferences are comparable to those observed in some of the European democ-
racies with the highest district magnitude variation. For instance, the num-
ber of seats per district fluctuates between 1 and 35 in Spain, while in Portu-
gal it ranges from 3 to 58 (Gschwend 2007; Lago 2008). As noted by 
Gschwend (2007), such large variations imply that standard arguments em-
phasizing the influence of district magnitude on voters’ strategic behavior – 
developed in principle for the purpose of comparing the frequency of tacti-
2  No extensive redistricting process took place during this period. 
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cal voting across electoral systems with varying degrees of proportionality – 
should also apply to a country like Uruguay. 
Table 1: Average Magnitude of Uruguay’s Electoral Districts, 1946-2009 
District Average Magnitude
Montevideo 42.5
Canelones 11.5
Colonia 4.4
Paysandú 3.3
Salto 3.2
Maldonado 2.9
Soriano 2.9
San José 2.8
Rivera 2.7
Florida 2.6
Tacuarembó 2.5
Cerro Largo 2.5
Rocha 2.5
Lavalleja 2.3
Durazno 2.2
Artigas 2.1
Flores 2.0
Río Negro 2.0
Treinta y Tres 2.0
Source:  Authors’ own calculation. 
As noted by Benoit (2001), the impact of district magnitude on agents’ be-
havior is conditioned and modulated by the type electoral formula used. In 
this sense, the characteristics and evolution of Uruguay’s electoral system 
during the period under study also allow us to appraise the interrelated ef-
fect of district magnitude and electoral formula on the tactical behavior of 
candidates and parties. Elections for the executive and the legislative 
branches are held concomitantly and are connected by means of a “block 
vote” (Buquet and Chasquetti 2008): citizens can only choose presidential 
candidates and lists of senators and representatives running under the same 
party label. The indissoluble link between presidential and legislative races 
mitigates the influence of several confounding factors – e.g., “policy-balanc-
ing” voting, disengagement between “nationalized” presidential contests and 
“localized” legislative choices, distinction between midterm and general 
election-years (Blais and Gschwend 2010; Gschwend 2007) – that prevail in 
other institutional settings and facilitates the simultaneous analysis of elite-
voter interactions across elections. At the same time, the different rules used 
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for executive and legislative offices present agents with additional coordina-
tion dilemmas due to the tight relationship between the national and sub-
national electoral arenas (Lago and Montero 2009).  
As mentioned in the Introduction, the country’s presidential election 
rules underwent some important modifications in the last 60 years, while 
those regulating legislative races remained essentially unchanged during most 
of this period. A thorough description of Uruguay’s complex electoral sys-
tem is beyond the scope of this paper.3 Given our purposes, however, its 
main features and transformations can be summarized in three basic “elec-
toral regimes”. Under what we denominate “electoral regime 1”, employed 
before 1954 and then again between 1971 and 1994, presidents were elected 
by plurality. Each of the parties in the executive race was allowed to nomi-
nate multiple candidates, who competed against each other as well as against 
the other parties’ nominees. Votes for same-party candidates were pooled 
together, and the winner was the most-voted-for candidate within the plu-
rality party. Under “electoral regime 2”, inaugurated in the 1954 elections, 
the country adopted a nine member collegiate executive, with the first and 
second most voted-for parties occupying 6 and 3 seats in the National 
Council of Government, respectively. Parties could still nominate various 
executive candidates, and counselors within each of the two largest parties 
were elected by proportional representation. This second “regime” was only 
in force until 1966, and the country switched back to plurality after the 1967 
constitutional reform. Finally, the system currently in place – “electoral 
regime 3” – was introduced in the constitutional reform of 1997, which 
established a majority runoff rule and forced each party to present a single 
presidential candidate selected in mandatory open primary elections. 
Under the three “electoral regimes” considered, a closed-list propor-
tional representation system has been used to elect 30 senators in a single 
national district and 99 representatives in the 19 districts identified in Table 
1 above. The allocation of legislative seats by D’Hondt formula is deter-
mined in two fundamental steps. First, seats in the Senate and the House of 
Representatives are distributed proportionally across parties, taking the 
whole country as a single constituency. In a second stage, seats are appor-
tioned within each of the parties. The national constituency still remains for 
the Senate, but house seats are distributed between the party’s lists across 
the 19 electoral districts in proportion to the number of votes in each one. 
The only meaningful shift in this procedure during the period considered 
was instituted by the 1997 reform, which prohibited co-partisan house lists 
3  The interested reader should consult Buquet and Chasquetti (2008), Moraes (2008), 
Morgenstern (2001) and the references therein for details.  
 12 Ines Levin and Gabriel Katz 
to pool votes by forming electoral alliances (sublemas). Until then, under 
“electoral regimes” 1 and 2, seats in the house were first allocated across 
parties, then among within-party alliances, and finally between lists within 
each sublema. This mechanism, sometimes referred to as “triple simultaneous 
vote” (TSV), was abandoned under “electoral regime 3”. Table 2 outlines 
the defining characteristics of the three “regimes” and indicates their corre-
spondence with each of the 13 elections held between 1946 and 2009.  
Table 2:  Uruguayan Elections and Electoral Institutions, 1946-2009 
Election year “Electoral 
regime” 
Main electoral rules
1946 
1 Plurality rule in presidential elections. Closed-list PR with TSV in legislative elections. 1950 
1954 
2 
Collegiate (bipartisan) executive, with coun-
selors elected by within-party PR. Closed-list 
PR with TSV in legislative elections. 
1958 
1962 
1966 
1971 1 Plurality rule in presidential elections. Closed-list PR with TSV in legislative elections. 
Military dictatorship (1973-1985)a 
1984a 
1 Plurality rule in presidential elections. Closed-list PR with TSV in legislative elections. 1989 
1994 
1999 
3b 
Majority runoff in presidential elections. 
Closed-list PR in legislative elections; no 
TSV. 
2004 
2009 
Note:  a President Sanguinetti, elected in the 1984 election, took office in March 1985.  
b Under “electoral regime 3”, only first-round presidential races – held simultane-
ously with the legislative elections - are included in the analysis. 
Source:  Authors’ own compilation. 
This peculiar institutional design has also entailed profound consequences 
for political organizations. Specifically, as noted before, one of the byprod-
ucts of the Uruguayan electoral code has been an extremely fragmented 
internal party structure.4 The country’s party system, one of the most 
4  Again, a more detailed account of the characteristics and history of the Uruguayan 
party system can be found in Buquet and Chasquetti (2008), Moraes (2008) and 
Morgenstern (2001). 
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consolidated and competitive in Latin America (Cason 2002), is dominated 
by three major actors: the Blanco and Colorado parties on the center-right, and 
the Frente Amplio (currently Encuentro Progresista – Frente Amplio – Nueva May-
oría) on the left. These are the only three parties to have won presidential 
elections in Uruguay’s history and the ones that have occupied nearly all the 
legislative seats in the last 40 years.5 The center-left Partido Independiente, 
founded in 2004, is the only other political organization that has achieved 
parliamentary representation in the last two national elections. A myriad of 
minor parties – some of them emerging and disappearing between election 
years – usually participate in executive and legislative races as well, although 
generally with relatively modest success.  
Because Uruguayan electoral laws have historically encouraged within-
party competition by allowing multiple co-partisan candidates for various 
national and local offices, strongly organized autonomous factions with their 
own electoral incentives and goals have developed and coexisted inside each 
of the parties – especially within the three major contenders (Buquet and 
Chasquetti 2008; Morgenstern 2001). The role of within-party factions is 
particularly important in elections for the House of Representatives, since 
different house lists in each district have to compete not only against other 
parties’ lists, but also against their co-partisan rivals for the seats captured by 
the party. Because their votes are summed to determine the between-party 
contest, same-party lists have a common interest in obtaining the largest 
collective vote-share. At the same time, though, they are also encouraged to 
cultivate a “factional vote” and to try to differentiate themselves from each 
other (Moraes 2008). As a result, voters in Montevideo could choose be-
tween 45 house lists from 5 different political parties in the 2009 election, 
and even in Treinta y Tres, one of the smallest districts of the country (see 
Table 2), 23 lists fielded candidates for the House of Representatives. In 
consequence, not only the number of competing and voted-for parties, but 
also the corresponding number of lists, must be considered for understand-
ing and characterizing the electoral coordination problem in Uruguay. In 
this sense, while much research in this area (e.g., Blais and Carty 1991; 
Gschwend 2007, 2009; Lago and Montero 2009) has treated the party as the 
unit of analysis, the Uruguayan case illustrates the prominence of internal 
party dynamics and the need for a “multi-level” approximation to the coor-
dination problem in settings in which multiple agents within the parties face 
conflicting electoral incentives. 
5  All the senators and 97 of out 99 representatives in the 47th Legislature 
(2010-2015) belong to one of these three parties.  
 14 Ines Levin and Gabriel Katz 
Finally, the rather stable and homogeneous nature of the Uruguayan 
society (Calderón and Chong 2007) means that ethnic, linguistic, religious 
and social cleavages are not key determinants of the number of available and 
voted-for parties and lists. Therefore, we can use district-level data to ana-
lyze the impact of electoral rules and district magnitude on voters and politi-
cal elites while minimizing the influence of socio-demographic heterogeneity 
(Cox 1997).  
Hypotheses
Drawing on the literature on electoral coordination, and in light of the char-
acteristics of the Uruguayan electoral system discussed in the preceding 
section, we formulate six hypotheses to be tested in the empirical section of 
the paper. The first three hypotheses refer to the influence of district mag-
nitude on the number of competing and voted-for parties and lists. The 
fourth and fifth hypotheses center on the interaction between the electoral 
supply and demand, and the last one concerns the impact of changes in 
electoral rules. 
Empirical evidence consistently supports the claim that the smaller the 
district magnitude (M), the smaller the number of viable parties and the 
stronger the incentives for strategic party desertion (Blais and Gschwend 
2010; Gschwend 2009). Hence, it is reasonable to expect that, other things 
constant, the number of voted-for parties in Uruguay increases as the num-
ber of seats awarded per district rises. Furthermore, given the high degree of 
within-party fragmentation induced by Uruguayan electoral laws (Morgen-
stern 2001), if a party performs better as M grows because voters are less 
concerned about the possibility of wasting their vote, several lists could 
become viable competitors for the additional seats captured by this party. 
Thus, our first hypothesis (H.1) is that district magnitude has a positive 
impact on the number of voted-for parties, and an even greater positive 
impact on the number of voted-for lists. 
District magnitude should also affect the “supply side” of the electoral 
market – that is, the number of electoral options available to voters. If pro-
spective political contenders are mainly concerned about winning a seat, 
they should be more likely to enter an election the better their chances of 
success in the district. Because political elites are presumably aware of the 
fact that larger districts lower the threshold required for any party to gain 
seats (Cox 1997; Gunther 1989), we expect the number of contestants to 
increase with M. In the case of Uruguay, then, our second hypothesis (H.2) 
is that the supply of both parties and lists is an increasing function of the 
district magnitude. In fact, we expect the supply of lists to be actually more 
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responsive to district size than the supply of parties. As noted before, co-
partisan lists in Uruguay compete for the seats captured by the party in each 
constituency. District magnitudes in Montevideo and Canelones averaged 42 
and 11 between 1942 and 2009 (Table 1). Thus, with three major parties 
obtaining the bulk of the popular vote, a considerable number of lists within 
each party could aspire to gain a seat in these districts. At the other extreme, 
the average value of M in 14 of the remaining 17 districts was lower than 3 
during this period. Hence, within-party factions would essentially compete 
for 1 seat, which should clearly reduce the incentives for party elites to 
launch lists in these districts (Benoit 2001; Moraes 2008). 
Moreover, according to our third hypothesis (H.3), the effect of district 
magnitude on the supply of parties and lists should be stronger than on the 
demand side. As illustrated by Lago (2008), political elites are likely to be 
more attentive to the incentives for strategic coordination created by the 
district magnitude than voters. Thus, at the pre-entry stage of the electoral 
game (Cox 2007), parties should launch fewer candidacies as M decreases 
(Benoit 2001). In contrast, even in small districts some expressive voters 
may not respond to the “wasted vote argument,” and in very large districts 
some voters might still be willing to cast strategic votes (Gschwend 2007). 
Together, these two factors should render the behavior of voters less sensi-
tive to M than that of the elites, and should tend to weaken the association 
between district magnitude and the number of voted-for parties and lists for 
a given electoral supply. 
We also expect the number of available and voted-for parties and list to 
influence each other after accounting for the effect of district magnitude. 
On the one hand, the greater the number of electoral alternatives, the more 
likely voters will be to find an option “good enough” to support (Blais and 
Gschwend 2010). Also, a larger electoral supply would impose more strin-
gent informational requirements on voters (Katz et al. 2011), making it 
harder for them to distinguish between trailing and leading candidates and 
rendering strategic party- and list-desertion more unlikely (Cox 1997: 78-79). 
In this sense, the effect of a larger electoral supply holding M fixed would be 
somewhat similar to the impact of an increase in district magnitude in the 
standard Duvergerian or electoral coordination theories (Cox 1997; Cox and 
Shugart 1996). Clearly, the electoral supply in a district should be closely 
related to the number of legislative seats at stake, although considerable 
differences may subsist conditional on M. For instance, in the 2009 
Uruguayan election, the total number of lists voters could choose from in 
Flores (21) was one-third lower than in Río Negro (28), although both 
districts have the same magnitude (see Table 2). Therefore, our fourth hy-
pothesis (H.4) states that, other things being equal, we expect the number of 
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voted-for parties and lists in a district is an increasing function of the num-
ber of available parties and lists, respectively.  
At the same time, the number of competing parties and lists should be 
positively correlated with the expected number of voted-for parties and lists. 
As highlighted by Gschwend (2007) and Lago (2008), citizens can use past 
election results to form their expectations about the viability of the parties 
competing in a district. Simply put, the better parties fared in previous elec-
tions, the better voters anticipate them to perform in the next race. Extend-
ing this assertion to the Uruguayan setting, and in view of the linked elec-
toral fortunes of parties and lists imposed by the country’s unique institu-
tional design, we conjecture that previous results at both the party- and list- 
level should affect the number of voted-for parties and lists in a district. 
Further, we claim that political elites also rely on this kind of electoral his-
tory heuristics. That is, politicians’ decisions about whether or not to run in 
a district should also be influenced by their electoral outlook – i.e., their 
projected vote-share vis-à-vis the other contestants – which will be, at least to 
some extent, based on past election results. The empirical implication of this 
line of reasoning is that the demand and supply of parties and lists in an 
election should be positively related to the number of voted-for parties and 
lists in the previous election. This is our fifth hypothesis (H.5). 
Finally, we also expect the electoral reforms implemented in Uruguay 
during the period under study to have affected the number of available and 
voted-for parties and lists after accounting for the aforementioned variables. 
Even though district magnitudes above two typically imply that multiple 
parties are viable in legislative races, the combination of straight-party voting 
and plurality rule for presidential elections under “electoral regime 1” should 
have fostered the consolidation of a two-party system. In contrast, the 
switch to a majority runoff system under “electoral regime 3” ought to have 
attenuated this trend, leading to an increase in the upper-bound number of 
viable parties – from 2 to 3 (Cox 1997: chapter 6). The rules for integrating 
the collegiate executive under “electoral regime 2” should work in a similar 
direction, increasing the number of parties compared to “electoral regime 
1”. The number of lists, on the other hand, should be markedly lower under 
“electoral regime 3” than under the other two regimes. As mentioned in the 
previous section, the only major regulatory change in legislative elections 
under the period considered was introduced by the 1997 constitutional re-
form, namely, the elimination of the “triple simultaneous vote”. Under 
electoral regimes 1 and 2, house lists could pool votes by forming within-
party electoral alliances. Hence, even weak lists could conceivably hope to 
achieve legislative representation by “borrowing strength” from other lists in 
their sublema. This was no longer the case under “electoral regime 3”. Under 
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the latter system, voters and political elites should eventually realize that 
some lists – especially in small magnitude districts – do not have any real 
chance of success. To sum up, then, our sixth hypothesis (H.6) can be for-
mulated as follows: the number of parties is larger under electoral regimes 2 
and 3 than under “electoral regime 1”, while the number of lists is smallest 
under “electoral regime 3”.  
Because of the positive relationship between the number of available 
and voted-for parties postulated in H.4 and H.5, we expect hypothesis H.6 
to hold for both the demand and the supply side of the electoral market. 
However, we do not have clear a priori intuitions about the relative impact of 
the different electoral rules on each side. Political actors have to become 
acquainted with the reforms and need to learn how best to play the game 
defined by the new institutions. Parties might have to fine-tune their cam-
paign messages and redefine their political strategies. Voters may need to 
update their expectations and alter their decision-making “model”. Since 
electoral institutions are largely endogenous to the party system (Boix 1999), 
and because politically inattentive citizens are typically unable to anticipate 
the potential consequences of reforms (Lagos 2008), political elites should 
presumably “move first”. Voters’ response to possible supply shifts, though, 
could in turn have profound implications for the parties’ electoral fortunes 
and for the characteristics and evolution of the party system (Gschwend 
2007). Such dynamic adjustment process might require a substantial amount 
of time and lots of political learning before a new equilibrium is reached 
(Benoit 2001; Cox 1997), so formulating precise theoretical predictions 
about the comparative effect of the reforms under consideration on the 
number of available and voted-for parties/ lists is far for straightforward. 
This is ultimately an empirical issue about which previous research – having 
generally failed to account for the interconnection of elites’ and voters’ 
strategic decision – offers little guidance.  
To conclude this section, Table 3 below summarizes the six hypotheses 
to be tested in the empirical part of the paper. 
 18 Ines Levin and Gabriel Katz 
Table 3: Theoretical Predictions  
Hypothe-
sis 
Variable 
whose im-
pact is being 
assessed 
Impact on the electoral demand and supply 
Demand side Supply side 
Number 
of voted-
for par-
ties  
Number 
of voted-
for lists 
Number 
of com-
peting 
parties 
Number 
of com-
peting 
lists 
H.1 District Mag-nitude + 
+ and > 
than on 
parties 
  
H.2 District Mag-nitude   + 
+ and > 
than on 
parties 
H.3 District Mag-nitude 
> than on 
the supply 
of parties 
> than on 
the supply 
of lists 
< than on 
the de-
mand for 
parties 
< than on 
the 
demand 
for lists 
H.4 
Supply of 
parties and 
lists 
+ +   
H.5 
Demand for 
parties and 
lists in t-1 
+ + + + 
H.6 Electoral regime 
Regime 1 
< Regimes 
2, 3 
Regime 3 
< Regimes 
1, 2  
Regime 1 
< Re-
gimes 2, 3 
Regime 3 
< Regimes 
1, 2 
Source:  Authors’ own compilation. 
Methodology 
To assess the validity of the theoretical predictions formulated above, we 
implement a hierarchical seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model (Chib 
and Greenberg 1995) using district-level data from the 13 elections held in 
Uruguay between 1946 and 2009. Our specification allows the number of 
competing and voted-for parties and list to be influenced by different fac-
tors and to exhibit varying degrees of volatility across districts and races 
while accommodating potential correlation between the electoral demand 
and supply. Thus, this empirical approach is particularly well suited to test 
our hypotheses – especially H.4 and H.5 – and, more generally, to better 
account for the interdependence between the behavior of voters and politi-
cal elites that is crucial for the outcome of the coordination process (Blais 
and Carty 1991; Cox 1997; Indridason 2008). 
The dependent variables in our model are: the number of parties (P) 
presenting candidates in each district and election; the number of lists (L) 
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available to voters in each district and election; the effective number of 
parties (ENP); and the effective number of lists (ENL).6 The first two 
variables represent the supply side of the electoral market. The last two aim 
at capturing the demand side – i.e., the number of voted-for parties and lists 
– and are measured as 2
1
pt
pt
ENP
v


 and 2
1 ,lt
lt
ENL
v


 where vpt and 
vlt are, respectively, the share of the vote received by party p and list l at 
election t (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). As seen below the four variables 
exhibit sizeable variations across districts (Table 4) and between election-
years (Figure 1) over the period under analysis.  
Table 4: Average Number of Parties and Lists, by District Magnitude 
District Mag-
nitude (M) 
Number of observa-
tions (districts 
across elections) 
Supply side Demand side 
P L ENP
 
ENL
 
2 117 5.8 25.8 2.5 5.8 
3 75 6.2 22.9 2.6 6.2 
4 20 6.4 23.9 2.6 6.4 
5 8 5.8 23.4 2.4 5.8 
5 < M < 15 14 7.2 36.9 2.6 7.2 
M > 38 13 8.5 64.6 2.9 8.5 
Source:  Authors’ own calculation.
6  The number of lists is approximated by the number of “voting-sheets” supplied by 
parties in each election and district. Voting-sheets are paper ballots including com-
binations of same-party candidacies for a variety of elective offices. Each represen-
tatives’ list may be supplied in a single or multiple voting-sheets – where in each 
voting-sheet the list is paired with different same-party candidates running for other 
elective offices. Thus, the number of ballot sheets is always greater than or equal to 
the number of representatives’ lists. 
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Figure 1: Total Number of Available and Voted-for Parties and Lists between 
1942 and 2009 
 
Note:  Thick black lines give average values for each election year, grey points indicate 
district-level values, smooth vertical lines indicate a change in the electoral regime, 
and broken vertical lines indicate the democratic interruption (1973 to 1985). 
Source:  Authors’ own compilation. 
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For each district i and election t, our vector of dependent variables can be 
represented as  , , , .it it it it itY P ENP L ENL  We allow for contemporane-
ous correlation between the four dependent variables by specifying a multi-
variate normal distribution for itY , with variance-covariance matrix   and 
mean  , , , .P ENP L ENLit it it it it       
In accordance with hypotheses H.1–H.5, the components of the mean 
vector jit , where  	ENLLENPPj ,,,
 , are modeled as functions of the 
district magnitude ( itM ) and of the electoral supply and demand in the 
previous race. In addition, since hypothesis H.6 focuses on the impact of the 
three different “electoral regimes” identified in Uruguay on the number of 
available and voted-for parties and lists, we also include indicators for the 
regimes in the specification of jit .  
Because electoral rules apply to all districts in the country in a given set 
of elections (see Table 2), it is necessary to account for the hierarchical 
structure of the data. Failing to do so would violate the assumption of inde-
pendent and identically distributed errors, potentially leading to negatively 
biased standard errors and erroneous substantive conclusions drawn from 
“spuriously significant” statistical effects (Antweiler 2001; Maas and Hox 
2004). In order to avoid these problems, we use a multi-level specification 
(Gelman et al. 2004) with random effects by district and election-year. The 
election-effects are modeled as a function of the “electoral regime”, as well 
as of idiosyncratic or temporal factors that may induce changes in the aver-
age values of the dependent variables beyond those related to the electoral 
reforms. The district-random effects, in turn, capture possible time-constant 
heterogeneity between constituencies while simultaneously accommodating 
potential correlation in electoral demand and supply between neighboring 
geographical units. Prior work finds strong evidence of geographical clus-
tering of citizens’ political preferences as well as strategic voting behavior 
(Fieldhouse, Shryane, and Pickles 2007).  
Further, as seen in Figure A.1 in the Appendix, Uruguay’s largest 
districts are all concentrated in the south and the west, closer to the 
Montevideo, while the smallest constituencies are situated in the center part 
of the country. It is possible that districts located within the same economic 
or geographic region, or closer to the capital of the country, engage in cross-
district coordination (Cox 1999). To accommodate potential correlation of 
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in the outcomes of electoral coordination across districts, we use a CAR-
Normal distribution (Thomas et al. 2004) for the district random intercepts.7 
The model specification can thus be written as:  
 ~ , ,it itY N    
1 1,
P P P P P P
it t i M it ENP it ENL it   M  ENP  ENL        
1 1,
L L L L L L
it t i M it ENP it ENL it   M  ENP  ENL        
1 1 1,
ENP ENP ENP ENP ENP ENP ENP
it t i M it ENP it ENL it P it   M  ENP  ENL  P        
 
1 1 1,
ENL ENL ENL ENL ENL ENL ENL
it t i M it ENP it ENL it L it   M  ENP  ENL  L        
 
 ~ , ,j j jt rN    
 ~ 0, ,j jr rN   
 ~ . ,ji Dcar N   
where jt  and 
j
r  are normally distributed election- and regime-random 
intercepts with respective variances j  and jr ; 
j
i  are district-random 
intercepts following a multivariate CAR-Normal distribution with the com-
ponents of the variance-covariance matrix D  specified as functions of the 
distance between the main (capital) cities in each constituency (Thomas et al. 
2004); and the s are fixed coefficients associated with the district magnitude 
itM  and the lagged values of the dependent variables 1 1 1, ,it it itP L ENP    
and 1.itENL 
8 
Estimation was performed by Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
simulations (Gelman et al. 2004). Three parallel chains were run for 50,000 
iterations, keeping every 10th iteration to reduce autocorrelation and dis-
                                                 
7  Following the suggestion of one of the reviewers, we also estimated an alternative 
model in which district effects were modeled as a function of the distance of each 
constituency from Montevideo. The results of this alternative model are reported in 
the Supplementary Materials.  
8  While hypothesis H.4 refers to the effect of Pt and Lt on ENPt and ENLt, we also 
control for the lagged values Pt-1 and Lt-1 in the equations for 
ENP
it  and 
ENL
it  to 
account for both contemporaneous and dynamic interrelations between the elec-
toral supply and demand. 
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carding the draws from first-half of each chain as “burn-in”. Convergence 
was assessed based on Gelman and Rubin’s diagnostic (Best, Cowles, and 
Vines 1996; Gelman and Rubin 1992). Samples from the second half of each 
chain were pooled and used to summarize the posterior distributions of the 
model parameters.9  
Figure 2: Marginal Effect of M , Pt-1, Lt-1, ENPt-1 and ENLt-1 on the Number of 
Competing and Voted-for Parties and Lists 
 
Note:  The center dots represent the marginal effect of M, ENPt-1, ENLt-1, Pt-1 and Lt-1 on 
the electoral supply and demand. Horizontal lines correspond to the 90% credible 
intervals. 
Source:  Authors’ own calculation. 
                                                 
9  The model was fit using WinBugs 1.4 (Lunn et al. 2000). The code is available from 
the authors upon request. 
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Results
Figure 2 reports the estimated marginal effect on the number of competing 
and voted-for parties and lists of a change in district magnitude and in the 
electoral supply and demand in the previous race.10  
Regarding the impact of district magnitude (M), and in line with our 
first hypothesis (H.1), a one-unit increment in M raises the effective number 
of lists in the constituency by 0.27 units on average. A larger M is also asso-
ciated with a slight increase on the number of vote-getting parties, although 
the effect in this case is indistinguishable from 0 at the 0.1 level. The influ-
ence of district magnitude on the supply of parties and lists, on the other 
hand, is more conclusive. For each additional seat awarded in the district in 
any given race, the number of parties and lists fielding candidates in the con-
stituency increase by 0.15 and 1.68, respectively. These estimates are signifi-
cant at the usual confidence levels, providing apparent support for our 
second hypothesis (H.2).  
Also consistent with our expectations, the number of competing and 
voted-for lists is more elastic to changes in the district magnitude than the 
corresponding number of parties. That is, as outlined by Piñeiro (2004), the 
effect of district magnitude on electoral coordination in Uruguay is exerted 
at the sub-party, rather than at the party level. Political elites respond to 
variations in M by essentially adjusting the number of house lists they pre-
sent in each constituency. In large districts, where parties – especially Blancos, 
Colorados and the Frente Amplio – expect to gain a considerable number of 
seats, competition between co-partisan factions drives the number of lists 
up. In contrast, in smaller constituencies, where the competition takes place 
fundamentally between parties, political elites still field partisan candidates 
but avoid wasting resources and restrict internal competition by limiting the 
number of lists voters can choose from. Unlike previous work on Uru-
guayan elections (e.g., Piñeiro 2004), however, our analysis underscores that 
the predominant role of within-party factions in lower house races is not 
exclusively explained by the decisions of political elites at the “pre-entry” 
stage of the coordination game. Citizens too, in turn, respond to M by fur-
ther concentrating their votes among fewer lists in smaller districts without 
necessarily deserting the parties due to tactical considerations.  
                                                 
10  The (log-transformed) parameter estimates of the SUR model used to calculate 
these marginal effects are reported in the Supplementary Materials. 
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Figure 3: Effect of an Increase in M on the Number of Parties and Lists, by                 
District Magnitude  
Note:  Center dots correspond to the predicted number of parties and lists assuming a 
one-unit increase in M, for different district magnitudes. Black vertical lines repre-
sent the 90% credible intervals, while gray lines discriminate between small, me-
dium and large districts. 
Source:  Authors’ own compilation. 
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In order to illustrate the relationship between district magnitude and the 
number of competing and voted-for parties in greater detail, we simulated 
the effect of a unit increase in M on the four dependent variables for each of 
the different average constituency sizes observed in Uruguay. The results of 
this counter-factual exercise, summarized in Figure 3 below, clearly indicate 
that the impact of district magnitude is contingent on the baseline value of 
M. While the marginal effect of M in smaller constituencies is strongly and 
significantly related to an increase in L, ENL and P, it is usually negligible in 
Montevideo.  
In addition, the estimates reported in Figures 2 and 3 also confirm that 
the effect of district magnitude on the supply side of the electoral market is 
greater than on the demand side, as stated in hypothesis H.3. For instance, 
as noted above, the response of supply of lists to a given change in M is 
more than 5 times higher than the response of the demand. Furthermore, a 
comparison of the graphs in the upper and lower panels of Figure 3 also 
suggests that party elites in Uruguay seem to be much more attentive than 
voters to the incentives for strategic coordination generated by variations in 
M. Differences in the predicted values of P and L between very low and 
very large districts are apparent in the figure. In contrast, the estimates re-
garding the number of vote-getting parties and lists are less clear-cut, with 
less variation and more overlapping in the predicted values of ENL and 
ENP across magnitudes. This finding is in accordance with Lago (2008), 
who showed that voters do not typically know the precise number of seats 
at stake in their district and are thus more likely to rely on alternative heuris-
tics – such as previous election outcomes – in their decision-making proc-
ess.  
This conclusion is reinforced by examining the effect of the electoral 
supply and demand in the previous race. As seen in Figure 2, there is strong 
positive association between the effective number of parties and lists at time 
t-1 and t. Holding other variables constant, a one-unit increase in ENPt-1 
augments the number of voted-for parties by 0.60 in the following election, 
while the marginal impact of ENLt-1 on the number of vote-getting lists in 
the next race is 1.51. These results can be interpreted as indicating that vot-
ers use “electoral history heuristics” to form their expectations about the 
number of viable parties and lists in a district race. Moreover, the number of 
voted-for parties and lists in the previous race is also significantly correlated 
with the subsequent electoral supply: other things equal, a marginal increase 
in ENP t-1 and ENL t-1 raise the number of parties and lists competing in t by 
0.38 and 1.98, respectively. In other words, as expected according to hy-
pothesis H.5, politicians also use information from previous elections as 
heuristic aids to decide whether or not to run in a district.  
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In contrast, our fourth hypothesis (H.4), that holds that the number of 
voted-for parties and lists is an increasing function of the electoral supply, 
finds little support in the data. As seen in Table A.1 in the Appendix, which 
reports point estimates and 90% credible intervals for the elements of the 
variance-covariance matrix of the four dependent variables, all but one of 
the pairwise correlations between the variables capturing the electoral supply 
(P and L) and those representing the demand (ENP, ENL) are statistically 
insignificant at the 0.1 level. Figure 2 shows that previous electoral supply 
fails to systematically affect the number of vote-getting parties and lists as 
well. In some sense, this negative finding actually lends more credence to 
the recent contributions of Gschwend (2007) and Lago (2008). As discussed 
before, the political science literature has traditionally claimed that the in-
formation requirements for tactical voting are quite stringent (Cox 1997; 
Leys 1959; Sartori 1968), and that the increase in district magnitude or the 
proliferation of electoral options, can overwhelm voters to the point of 
hindering their strategic calculations. Evidence from Portugal, Spain and 
now Uruguay challenges – or at least attenuates – this contention, suggesting 
that voters can in fact resort to simple cues like previous election outcomes 
in order to try to distinguish between hopeless and viable candidates. 
Turning to the analysis of the three “electoral regimes” identified in 
Uruguay between 1946 and 2009, Table 5 summarizes the estimated impact 
of each regime on the number of available and voted-for parties and lists, 
compared against the average predicted values for the whole period under 
study. The estimates for “regime 1” are presented discriminating between 
the two periods in which it was used, 1946-1950 and 1971-1994. Figure 4 
complements this information, presenting election-specific effects capturing 
the influence of additional contextual factors that may have influenced the 
evolution of the dependent variables beyond the electoral reforms.  
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Figure 4: Election-Year Marginal Effects 
Note:  Center dots correspond to the estimated marginal election-effects, while the black 
vertical lines correspond to the 90% credible intervals. 
Source:  Authors’ own compilation. 
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Table 5:  Marginal Effects of the “Electoral Regimes”a
 PARTIES (P) LISTS (L)
 5% 
per-
centile 
Mean 
95% 
per-
centile 
5% per-
centile Mean 
95% 
per-
centtile 
Regime 1 
(1946-1950) 0.66 0.90 1.16 -9.08 -8.24 -7.39 
Regime 2 
(1954-1966) 0.39 0.53 0.67 -3.71 -2.87 -2.08 
Regime 1 
(1971-1994) -0.24 -0.10 0.05 11.54 12.92 14.29 
Regime 3 
(1999-2009) -0.75 -0.61 -0.47 -1.25 -0.31 0.72 
 
 ENP ENL 
 5% 
per-
centile 
Mean 
95% 
per-
centile 
5% per-
centile Mean 
95% 
per-
centtile 
Regime 1 
(1946-1950) 0.01 0.07 0.13 -2.07 -1.50 -0.88 
Regime 2 
(1954-1966) -0.20 -0.16 -0.12 -0.70 -0.26 0.17 
Regime 1 
(1971-1994) 0.03 0.09 0.14 1.45 2.01 2.59 
Regime 3 
(1999-2009) 0.03 0.08 0.14 -0.85 -0.40 0.07 
Note:  a The table reports point estimates (means) and 90% credible intervals for marginal 
effects of each electoral regime on P, L, ENP and ENL. Regime effects are com-
puted as the average-election effects for the period in which they were in force. 
Source:  Authors’ own calculation. 
In line with our expectations, the number of parties running for office under 
“electoral regime 2”, in force between 1954 and 1966, was 0.53 than the 
average over the whole period. However, P was not significantly higher than 
in the 1946-1950 elections, held under “electoral regime 1”. Moreover, the 
effective number of parties under “regime 2” was actually lower than the 
1946-2009 average. Also contrary to our theoretical predictions, P was low-
est under “electoral regime 3”. The results for lists are quite inconclusive as 
well. As stated in our sixth hypothesis (H.6), the elimination of the “triple 
simultaneous vote” (TSV) after the 1997 reform tended to reduce the num-
ber of available and voted-for lists under “electoral regime 3” vis-à-vis the 
previous 2 regimes. However, this effect is not significant at the usual confi-
dence levels. Overall, then, we find no consistent support for hypothesis H.6. 
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It is important to mention that the reinstatement of “regime 1” in 1971 
took place simultaneously with the emergence of a new major party – the 
Frente Amplio – exhibiting a relatively large degree of within-party fractional-
ization. This might partially explain the above-average levels of supplied and 
voted-for parties and lists observed under “regime 1” between 1971 and 
1994 (Table 5). Also, it is worth noting that, even though the removal of the 
TSV did not lead to a significant reduction in the supply and demand for 
lists, it coincided with a clear reversal in the trend towards greater within-
party fractionalization observed during the previous electoral regime. Thus, 
it seems that the prohibition for same-party lists to pool votes for the house 
elections did, to some extent, reduce the incentives for launching and sup-
porting a large number of lists. Of course, this sudden drop in the number 
of competing and vote-getting lists need not only be explained by the new 
electoral regime, but also by the attainment of a new long-term electoral 
equilibrium once the Frente Amplio became a more consolidated party. 
A closer look at Figure 4 also uncovers some interesting patterns re-
garding voters’ and elites’ reactions to the electoral reforms implemented 
during the period considered. The trends followed by the number of com-
peting and voted-for lists shows roughly similar behaviors of voters and 
elites throughout the period considered. This is not only true before 1997, 
when the rules for legislative races remained constant, but also after the 
change introduced by the Constitutional reform. In contrast, P and ENP 
exhibit strikingly different tendencies in most of the election-years. Part of 
this divergence may be explained by the fact that, as discussed before, 
adapting to new electoral laws can take a relatively long time (Cox 1997; 
Gschwend 2007). Still, the fact that agents adjusted quite rapidly to changes 
in legislative rules but not in the presidential formula marks an interesting 
contrast. As stressed by Lago and Montero (2009), when elections for dif-
ferent elective bodies are simultaneously held under distinctive electoral 
systems, the strategic dilemmas faced by the political actors become par-
ticularly complex. There is virtually no research, however, on the impact of 
transformations in electoral laws on concurrent presidential and parliamen-
tary races, how they influence the strategic calculations of voters and politi-
cal elites, and whether these changes impact primarily at the executive or 
legislative level. Future work on this issue might help explain some of 
puzzling patterns regarding the evolution of the number of competing and 
voted-for parties observed in the figure.  
Finally, as a robustness check, and following a reviewer’s suggestion, we 
fit an alternative model with district-specific intercepts modeled as a func-
tion of the distance from Montevideo (see footnote 6). The main substan-
tive conclusions of this specification, which are presented in the Supple-
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mentary Materials accompanying this paper (see Online Appendix available 
as this article’s supplementary material at <www.jpla.org>), are essentially 
identical to those reported here. In particular, while this alternative specifica-
tion indicates that the number of voted-for lists in each district is also 
negatively influenced by the distance from Montevideo, the results regarding 
hypotheses H.1–H.6 remain unchanged, reinforcing the validity of our 
findings.  
Conclusion 
Understanding the nature of electoral coordination is important because it 
potentially affects the representativeness of the elected government, the 
responsiveness and stability of the political system and, ultimately, the pol-
icy-making process and its outcomes. Coordination takes place both at the 
voter and the elite level: the mechanism defined by the electoral system to 
translate votes into seats creates incentives for citizens seeking to avoid 
“wasting their vote” and for political elites trying to maximize their chances 
of success to concentrate their support and resources on a few viable candi-
dates. The result of the process, namely, the number of vote-getting con-
testants in a given race, will be thus determined by the mutually dependent 
decisions of voters and political elites. The strategic dilemmas faced by the 
agents become further complicated when they participate in a variety of 
races held under different electoral laws, as is typically – though not exclu-
sively – the case in mixed-member systems or in multi-level democracies. 
The empirical approach implemented in this paper explicitly addresses these 
issues, simultaneously analyzing the impact of electoral rules and district 
magnitude on the number of competing and voted-for parties and house 
lists in Uruguay between 1946 and 2009. 
Our results suggest that there is indeed a close relationship between 
relevant features of Uruguay’s electoral structure and the outcomes of the 
coordination process. Consistent with previous research (Amorim Neto and 
Cox 1997; Benoit 2001; Blais and Carty 1991; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 
1994), we found that district magnitude has a positive and significant effect 
on the number of competing and voted-for parties and lists. Given the pe-
culiar characteristics of the Uruguayan electoral and party systems, the im-
pact of district magnitude is larger at the within-party than at the party level. 
Also, it is considerably larger on the supply than on the demand side of the 
electoral market, indicating that political elites in Uruguay are more respon-
sive to the incentives for strategic coordination induced by variations in 
district magnitude. This does not mean, as previous work suggested, that 
because Uruguay’s intricate electoral laws impose strict information re-
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quirement on voters, strategic coordination can only take place among po-
litical elites (Piñeiro 2004: 37). Not only do voters take into account the 
influence of district magnitude in their electoral calculations, but in addition 
they also rely heavily on electoral history heuristics to discriminate between 
hopeless and viable candidates. In fact, our estimates reinforce previous 
findings by Gschwend (2007) and Lago (2008) in the sense that, when faced 
with complex decision environments, citizens use simple cues to avoid 
wasting their vote. Moreover, our evidence shows that politicians rely on 
previous election results as well in order to decide whether or not to run in a 
district.  
Regarding the impact of electoral regimes, we did not find support for 
the hypothesis that the collegiate executive or introduction of a majority 
runoff system gave way to a larger number of competing and voted-for 
parties. Similarly, although the elimination of the possibility for same-party 
lists to pool votes for house races after 1997 seems to be associated with a 
decrease in the number of launched and vote-getting lists, this correlation is 
not significant at the usual confidence levels. Nonetheless, while previous 
studies concluded that the Uruguayan party system was on a path of in-
creasing fractionalization (González 1991; Piñeiro 2004), our estimates 
clearly indicate that this tendency was reversed after the 1997 electoral re-
form. This suggests the removal of the “triple simultaneous vote” might in 
fact have contributed stop the expansion of within-party fragmentation 
observed between 1954 and 1994. 
Turning to the limitations of our study, it is important to recall that 
correlation does not imply causation. A more careful causal analysis would 
require controlling for other factors that might also affect elite and voter 
behavior, such as demographic characteristics of the population, socio-eco-
nomic conditions and other election-specific forces. Even though we com-
pared contiguous elections and geographically close districts from a single, 
relatively homogeneous country, it would be obviously unrealistic to assume 
that all these relevant factors remained constant during the 58-year period 
under consideration. Nonetheless, we are confident that our approach im-
proves upon previous cross-country studies that fail to control for differ-
ences other than aggregate-level institutional features and coarse measures 
of socio-demographic heterogeneity such as the number of ethnic groups.  
A promising avenue for future research would be to replicate our analy-
sis using individual-level data – ideally, obtained from a panel survey design 
clustered on the electoral district level – and extend it to other Latin Ameri-
can democracies. This would allow assessing the robustness of the main 
results reported here and enable a more precise account of agents’ electoral 
incentives and behavior. Obviously, since political surveys in most countries 
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of the region generally cover only a handful of elections – typically those 
held after the return of democracy in 1980s and 1990s (Mattes 2007) – this 
kind of study would require sacrificing the broader historical perspective 
adopted in this paper. Hopefully, complementary research on micro-foun-
dations and macro-outcomes will contribute to advance our knowledge 
about the impact of institutions on electoral coordination in Latin America.  
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Modelando la Coordinación Electoral: Votantes, Partidos y Listas 
Legislativas en Uruguay 
Resumen: En cada período electoral, votantes y élites interactúan para 
determinar el número de agentes políticos postulados para la elección, así 
como el número de agentes políticos que reciben apoyo de los votantes. En 
este artículo, modelamos la interacción entre votantes y élites usando un 
modelo jerárquico de regresiones aparentemente no relacionadas, explicando 
la coordinación electoral a nivel de distrito en el Uruguay en función de la 
magnitud del distrito, resultados de elecciones anteriores, y régimen elec-
toral. Las elecciones en este país son particularmente útiles para el estudio de 
los determinantes institucionales de la coordinación electoral debido a la 
amplia variación en la magnitud de los diferentes distritos, a la simultaneidad 
de las elecciones presidenciales y legislativas reguladas por normas elec-
torales diversas, y a las reformas que tuvieron lugar durante el período bajo 
consideración. Encontramos que la magnitud del distrito y la información 
que los agentes extraen de la historia electoral tienen efectos sustantivos 
sobre número de partidos y listas que compiten y reciben votos en cada 
elección. Nuestra estrategia empírica revela importantes efectos interactivos 
entre la oferta y demanda electoral que, no obstante, han sido frecuente-
mente ignorados en investigaciones anteriores.  
Palabras clave: Uruguay, partidos, listas, votación estratégica, coordinación 
electoral 
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Appendix
Figure A.1: Geographical Distribution of the 19 Uruguayan Districts 
Note:  The colors in the plot indicate average district magnitudes over the period 1946-
2009, with darker shades corresponding to increasingly larger magnitudes. 
Source:   Authors’ own compilation. 
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Table A.2: Posterior Estimates and 90% Credible Intervals of the Variance-
covariance Components from the SUR Model 
 5% percentile Mean 95% percentile 
Var(ENL) 0.037 0.043 0.051 
Var(L) 0.029 0.035 0.041 
Var(ENP) 0.007 0.008 0.009 
Var(P) 0.012 0.014 0.017 
Cov(ENL,L) 0.011 0.016 0.021 
Cov(ENL,ENP) 0.000 0.002 0.004 
Cov(ENL,P) -0.002 0.000 0.003 
Cov(L,ENP) -0.001 0.001 0.002 
Cov(L,P) 0.004 0.006 0.009 
Cov(ENP,P) 0.000 0.001 0.002 
Source:  Authors’ own calculation. 
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